can it be regarded as in any way "innocent"? To me it seems clear that the only correct answer to this last question must be an unequivocal No. Science and scientific are our own terms and they express our own concepts (which, by the way, does not mean that they are sharply defined or unproblematic); and, therefore, the study of any past intellectual activity can be relevant to what we call "history of science" only to the extent that such an activity can be shown to help us understand the modes of thought and expression and behavior that we have come to associate with the word science. This is not anachronism, presentism, whiggism, or any of the other objectionable isms, but a consequence of the fact that we who are writing the history also have a location of our own that defines our perspective and, hence, the questions we pose from our vantage point and the terms in which these questions are framed. Nor should this admission to a definite point of view discourage or detract from investigating past modes of thought and expression and behavior under other categories deemed suitable for elucidating these modes "in their own terms," as the phrase goes. But, without aiming to replace other approaches that put the emphasis on certain concerns of sociology or anthropology or cultural history, our historiography of science will always change as a function of our changing position, being ourselves forever located at the end point of the process that is continually shaping and reshaping what we call "science." And so I am led to combine a self-evident proposition with another that seems no more, and no less, than a corollary of it: that all history of science is local, and no history of science can ever be neutral.
The character of Arabic science, its strengths and failings, the course of its development, and its ultimate fate have all been variously explained in terms of language as a matrix of thought and expression, of religion as an inexorable shaping force, of natural aptitudes or inclinations of a certain race or inherent mentality, or as one inevitable expression of a world culture of which Islamic civilization was a late embodiment. A perceived emphasis on algebra in the Arabic tradition has been attributed to certain features of Semitic languages that make these languages or their native users prone to "algebraization," as opposed to Greek "geometrization." The persistent attempts of Islamic astronomers to construct kinematic models primarily designed to save the principles and the logical consistency of Ptolemaic astronomy have been seen as a sign of poverty of imagination or of the tendency of the "Semitic mind" toward things it can easily perceive by the senses. Islamic religion has been cited both as the origin and source of vigor of medieval Islamic science and as the major cause of its final demise. And the "spirit of culture," in this case a Magian culture already at work in "so-called" late antiquity, has been invoked to account for every aspect of Islamic civilization, including its scientific products.2
It is not difficult to expose the weaknesses from which such explanations suffer. One can refer, for example, to the considerable and highly successful efforts of Islamic mathematicians in the fields of geometry and trigonometry. One can relate the theoretical program of Islamic astronomers to the work of Ptolemy himself and to earlier ideals of Greek astronomy. One can point out the great complexity of the relationship between science and religion throughout Islamic history and in various parts of the Islamic world. And one can easily show the vacuousness of theories born of the spirit-of-culture approach. And, in fairness to those who have advanced explanations of these sorts, it must be said that they tend to be poorly informed (or worse) about Arabic science and, in many cases, about Islamic civilization-a fact that, unfortunately, does not seem to have discouraged their influence on minds that seek ready-made and perhaps comforting explanations.
What is wrong with these explanations, and others like them, is not their consideration of language, religion, and culture as factors in the formation of a scientific enterprise that consciously adopted earlier traditions with markedly different languages and religious and cultural values but, rather, their essentialist character, which has tended to prejudice or obstruct historical research. Now locality-that is, the character of being local-is an ineradicable or, if you like, an essential property of all historical events, but the actual where and when and how of any such events are happenings created by human effort. With the sure perceptiveness of a true historian, Richard Southern once described the process of acquisition and adaptation of Greek learning in Islam as "the most astonishing event in the history of thought."3 The event is astonishing because it strikes us as unexpected, and the best way I know to explain the unexpected in history, insofar as it can be explained at all, is to try to understand it, not in terms of essences or spirits or inevitabilities, but as the outcome of choices by individuals and groups responding to their situations as they perceived and experienced them. Let me illustrate.
THE INTERSECTION OF ISLAMISM, ARABISM, AND HELLENISM IN NINTH-CENTURY BAGHDAD
The powerful drive that eventually led to the transfer of the bulk of Greek science and philosophy (as well as elements of the scientific thought of India and Persia) to Islam was launched as a massive translation effort that took place in the context of empire and under the patronage of the confident Abbasid court in Baghdad. Translations into Arabic had been made earlier, and these had been preceded in the Middle East by translations from the Greek into Syriac and Persian, but it was the Abbasids who mounted a concentrated translation effort soon after they came to power in the middle of the eighth century and who further organized and intensified their support during the ninth century. Under their predecessors, the Umayyads who ruled from Damascus (661-750), the Islamic empire already encompassed large areas-including Egypt, Syria, and Persia-that had come under the influence of Hellenism from the time of Alexander; and before the ninth century was over Islamic rule had reached Kashmir in the east and Khwarazm to the north. In the early Abbasid period the higher administration of the court itself was in the hands of cultivated Persians who had gained much favor and influence with the Abbasid rulers and whose intellectual interests inclined them to various forms of secular learning and to a rationalizing approach for understanding matters of religious belief. Some of these Persian officials acted as translators, especially from Persian, and in general they constituted an Greek thought itself in a number of scientific, medical, and philosophical disciplines. And although much additional Greek material was later to be brought over the borders with Byzantium, the continuity with the Greco-Syriac tradition helps to explain the high level of competence, even sophistication, that characterized scientific writings in Arabic from an early period that overlapped the translation movement.
One might then say, and with much justification, that the stage was set, at a certain place and time, for the translation movement that quickly acquired unprecedented proportionsunprecedented not only in the Middle East but in the world at large. But in order to explain the momentum, scope, and multiple dimensions of that movement, it is necessary to go beyond the availability of favorable conditions, and even beyond the important consideration of practical expectations that must have loomed large at least in the minds of the Muslim patrons. Islamic religion had introduced a new ideology with sweeping and universalist claims. Already during the swift expansion of Islamic conquests, that ideology had come into direct contact with a large variety of creeds (Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian, Mazdian, Manichaean, etc.) with which it inevitably collided and against which it had not merely to defend but-much more importantly-to define itself, often in terms borrowed from its opponents. The result was a huge intellectual ferment, centered especially in multicultural Iraq, to which the movements of Islamic theology, philosophy, and science owed their birth.
Or, should we not rather say, more accurately, that the creation of these fields of thought represented the responses of so many groups of individuals to aspects of what was, in the context of religion and politics and power and the variety of competing ways to salvation, a very complex and live intellectual atmosphere? With regard to the creation of the tradition of science and philosophy in Islam, I am tempted to borrow an obsolete term, aspecting, in order to refer to the way in which individuals in a given culture aspect another culture as they direct their gaze to the other from their own location. Aspecting in this sense is conditioned both by the interests, aspirations, and aptitudes of the aspecting individuals and by the accessible aspects of the viewed culture, that is to say, the aspects that happen to be disclosed to them by the accidents of history or by their further, determined effort. Thus, for example, through the Sabians of Harran, Muslim thinkers were able to view facets of Hellenistic thought that might not have been available to them by way of the Christian theologians, who had already made their own choices from their own standpoints. And, as has been plausibly suggested, the absence of Greek literature and Greek historiography from the translated corpus may be attributable to a lack of acquaintance or serious interest on the part of the Christian translators.4 In a similar way, the twelfth-and thirteenthcentury Arabo-Latin translations in northern Spain were understandably limited to the types and the levels of the learning that was currently available in Al-Andalus, with all the features of that learning that had undoubtedly been shaped by a combination of circumstances peculiar to Al-Andalus.5
The scholars of eighth-and ninth-century Iraq looked east to Persia and India and west to Greece and especially to Alexandria. Both looks deeply affected the character of Arabic science, especially in mathematics and astronomy, in both of which we find combinations of identifiable elements from the East and the West. But it was the westward gaze that proved most enticing and, as it turned out, most consequential. Some years ago I used the term appropriation to characterize the attitude of Muslim scholars and patrons who made it their business to get hold of and make their own what they called "the sciences of the ancients," an expression that clearly revealed a sense of distance in time between themselves, as "the modems" (al-muta'akhkhirun), and the appropriated legacy of "the ancients" (al-mutaqaddimun), even as the appropriators set about gaining possession of the ancient legacies with great energy.6 Without aiming here to unfold the full meaning of that sense of distance (which has frequently been misinterpreted and misused in modem scholarship), let me indicate briefly how it was understood and evaluated by some of those who promoted or participated in the appropriation drive of the ninth century. individuals who were favorably disposed to the imported knowledge and who played an active part in bringing about what later proved to be a long-lasting tradition. But, of course, a few first steps, even significant ones, might not have been followed by others in the same direction or with the same determination and vigor. And, indeed, there were other, contemporary individuals and groups whose markedly different or contrary attitudes and intellectual commitments, then and in later periods, did much to shape the course of Arabic science. As I turn now to later developments, our story acquires a degree of complexity that I cannot hope to convey in a lecture. But I shall try to give you a sense of it. It is a complexity that further illustrates the usefulness of the methodological concept of locality, and it will lead me at the end of my talk to pose the general question of whether, and in what sense, Arabic science should be investigated as a single enterprise. The story unfolds in at least three distinct but by no means isolated loci whose different structures and modes of operation and interaction have yet to be explored from the standpoint of our subject. These loci are the college or institution of higher learning, the royal or princely court, and the mosque. I shall arbitrarily ignore the hospital as a result of excluding medicine from my present account.'2 I will begin with the college, and in order to bring you closer to an unfamiliar situation I will start with two general observations by way of comparison with more familiar episodes. The first is this: as far as science and philosophy are concerned, the European Renaissance of the sixteenth century was in part a reaction, which became more pronounced in the seventeenth century, against patterns of thought and argument associated with medieval "scholasticism." In Islamic history, events followed the reverse order: the "renaissance" (if that is the right word) came first, in the ninth and tenth centuries, and a form of scholasticism followed, though not immediately and not uniformly in all parts of the Muslim world. My second observation points to another contrast between Islam and medieval Europe that is crucially important but more difficult to describe briefly. In Islam, whether in ninth-and tenth-century Baghdad, eleventh-century Egypt and central Asia, twelfth-century Spain, thirteenth-century Maragha in northwestern Iran, or fifteenth-century Samarkand, the major scientific work associated with the names of those who were active at those times and places was carried out under the patronage of rulers whose primary interests lay in the practical benefits promised by the practitioners of medicine and astronomy and astrology and applied mathematics. Many of these practitioners were also prolific writers on "philosophy," a mode of thinking known by the Arabicized term falsafa and characterized to a large extent by a mixture of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic doctrines and forms of argument-the kind of mixture we find, for example, in the works of al-Kindli, al-Fdrdbl, and Avicenna. In those circumstances science and "philosophy," or falsafa, were secular activities that were practiced, developed, and propagated as rational inquiries completely independent of any religious authority-which, of course, did not prevent the proponents of this autonomous, self-legitimizing mode of thinking from offering their own rationalistic (i.e., Hellenic) interpretations of religious doctrines such as revelation or prophecy or providence and of religious institutions such as law. After all, falsafa was an all-embracing world view that claimed the right to scrutinize and account for everything within the sphere of human experience, including religious experience. In one case among the prominent devotees offalsafa, that of al-Kindli, a serious compromise was made by renouncing the Greek doctrine of the eternity of the world in favor of creatio ex nihilo. But unlike most of their Christian counterparts in medieval Europe, Islamic philosophers (the self-styled falasifa) and philosopher-scientists in that Greek sense were not "theologians" or members of religious orders. The one major exception, of sorts, is the twelfth-century Andalusian Averroes, who came from a celebrated traditional family of Malikite jurists and practiced the Malikite version of Muslim law as a judge, but who nevertheless believed himself to have inherited the mantle of Aristotle. I shall come back to him later. Now, Islamic "theology," or what has come to be known in Western scholarship by this name, followed a different course-with important, indeed far-reaching consequences for the development of both science and falsafa. It began to make a conspicuous appearance in the eighth century (the second Islamic century), well before the patronized translation movement got under way, as the activity of spontaneously sprouting groups of Muslim intellectuals in the urban centers of Basra and Baghdad who immersed themselves in probing discussions (kalam: speech, discussion, argument), obviously driven by their interest in current religious and political controversies. They gradually developed somewhat varied and sometimes seemingly indecisive but sophisticated and sophisticatedly argued doctrines concerning a comprehensive array of subjects that ranged all the way from God and his relation to man and the world, to questions of epistemology and morality and political leadership, to subtle and difficult speculations about the ultimate constitution of all created being, which they characteristically proposed to understand in atomistic terms. The falasifa later dubbed these kalam practitioners as religious apologists, thereby seeking to downgrade their rivals or, if possible, to circumscribe their role by subsuming their enterprise under the authority of falsafa. I3 There can be no doubt that the early practitioners of kalam, the mutakalliman, were influenced by a multiplicity of pre-Islamic traditions in ways that still remain mostly veiled in obscurity. But whatever the remote sources of their ideas, and despite their fundamental concern with the elucidation and critique of religious tenets, it is my conviction (which I share with a few others) that the discourse of the early "school" of the Mu'tazila, the one favored by al-Ma'mtin, and of the later and subsequently dominant Ash'arites, represents an important turn in the history of philosophical thought-one that gave rise to new styles of thinking that seriously challenged the Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism of falsafa by proposing a thoroughgoing atomism that viewed the world as a creative process. It was this new philosophy, the "philosophy of the kalam," as Harry Wolfson called it,'4 that, in the Ash'arite version, later found its way into the colleges of higher education, the socalled madrasas that ultimately spread wide and far over the Islamic world as endowed or charitable institutions, having been first introduced on a large scale in the eleventh century by the Sunnite Saljiiqs in Iraq and Persia as part of a political agenda and in response to the Ism'Tll-propaganda emanating from Fatimid Egypt and Syria.
The madrasas, it should be noted, were first conceived of as primarily schools of law, an emphasis that they retained throughout their history.'5 But, as creations of private endowments, they generally enjoyed a degree of informality that allowed for a variable range of intellectual pursuits that depended on local circumstances and the interests of their professors and their sponsors. Many, perhaps a large number, of the madrasas included some teaching in arithmetic, algebra, astronomy, and logic as part of the intellectual equipment of the practicing jurist, along with the indispensable disciplines of language and rhetoric. Kalam, as a study of the "fundamental tenets of religion" (usul al-dTn), performed the dual function of supplying a superstructure of theory for the rest of the "religious sciences" as well as a substitute for Greek metaphysics and natural philosophy.
Combining these two general observations should now help us to appreciate the following result. The sciences of the Greeks, which were first welcomed in Islam along with Greek theories of cosmology and epistemology and metaphysics (be they Hellenic or Hellenistic), eventually came to be confronted in the madrasas by a homegrown religious philosophy that claimed to develop viable alternatives to the Greek paradigms. None of these questions can be answered a priori. They are all empirical questions that require empirical research. Some of my colleagues, I am happy to say, are now beginning to tackle them in earnest. Others are reluctant to embrace them, being afraid of the possible danger of diverting too much attention from the vast quantities of scientific texts that remain to be edited and analyzed. The skeptics have a point, and I share their concern. But this is not an either/or matter. As for the argument that "we do not yet know enough to ask the big questions," my answer is this: it is only by attempting to formulate appropriate questions that can be fruitfully examined in light of what we now know that we make it possible for others to come up with deeper and more probing questions in the future. We do not know much (that is for certain), but the day when we know "enough" will never come. On the other hand, by altogether abandoning all programs of full-fledged historical research, we only tempt others to fill the vacuum with easy and useless essentialist generalizations.
The madrasas were not, therefore, in general a locus where scientific research was promoted for its own sake, but one in which science was interpreted and judged and Though primarily a place of worship, the mosque, from its inception, and as distinguished from the madrasa that was sometimes attached to it, often served as a forum for propagation and discussion of subjects related to Arabic language, grammar, and rhetoric, as well as the vital issues of law, religion, and politics. Through the introduction, apparently for the first time under the Mamluiks, of the office of muwaqqit, the timekeeper in charge of regulating the times of the five daily prayers, a place was created for the utilization of one form of scientific knowledge in a permanent religious institution.
Strictly speaking, it would be wrong to consider the muwaqqit a "professional" astronomer. His institutional role in the mosque was not to pursue the goals of astronomy as these had been defined and elaborated by Arabic astronomers since the ninth century but, as is clearly indicated by his status title, to offer reliable guidance to his local Islamic community with regard to definite religious observances (mainly prayer times) as specified '9 The distinction has to be maintained despite occasional or even frequent overlappings, as, for example, when a local ruler was responsible for the appointment of a favored professor in a madrasa. of the religious law continued to apply the simpler considerations, based on observations of twilight and horizon phenomena (rising and setting) or of shadow lengths, leaving alone the sophisticated mathematical treatises, which they "generally considered to be too complicated or even completely irrelevant."20 This is not really surprising (mathematical precision need not be considered a prerequisite of religious piety!), but it does render problematic the concept of the muwaqqit's mathematical work as "service to religion." On the other hand, the theoretical triumph of Ibn al-Shatir in planetary theory does not seem to have elicited serious attention from other contemporary muwaqqits, and this appears to be the result of the fact that their institutional position did not demand or encourage theoretical ventures for their own sake. Such paradoxes may simply reflect our present, inadequate knowledge of the circumstances in which a new institutional structure brought together mathematical and religious interests. But whatever the correct understanding of these paradoxes might be, it would be gratuitous to regard the work of the muwaqqit in aiding religious ritual as constituting "the essence of Islamic science" (as King puts it)21 or even as the most revealing aspect of scientific activity in Islam. To propose such a view may have the advantage of highlighting the uniqueness to Islamic civilization of a certain emphasis on some programs of astronomical research. But the disadvantages of this proposal are also glaringly conspicuous. It disregards the full extent of scientific research in Islam, and it ignores the characteristic complexity of Islamic civilization itself by neglecting the variety of religious attitudes with regard to the status, the function, and the value of scientific knowledge. And it might appear to equate "Islamic science" with narrowly circumscribed programs that largely developed within the confines of an institution with no commitment to "science" as such, and this alone would tend to obstruct or prejudice vital questions about scientific practice in Islam by identifying a single locus of activity with a widespread and extremely complex phenomenon. And, of course, it would again open the way into the trap of essentialism.
To come finally and very briefly to the general question formulated earlier: Was Arabic science one or many? A similar question has sometimes been asked with reference to Islamic art, where manifest varieties of styles and functions are displayed in the artifacts and architectural monuments of the vast Islamic world. As far as science is concerned, it seems to me that important considerations lead us to say that we have to do with a single, unitary tradition. These are considerations of language, which-for science and philosophy-was for the most part one language (Arabic), and of Islamic religion as an everpresent point of reference though not always a point of departure, in addition to considerations of the dominance of dynastic rules over large regions for extended periods of time and the remarkable ease of movetnient and communication all through the Muslim worlda feature itself connected to religion and law and language. And, with regard to communication of learning, we must also keep in mind that crucial Chinese invention, paper, which took the whole Islamic world by storm from the moment of its appropriation in the middle of the eighth century.
One example will have to suffice as an illustration of what I mean by these remarks. Writing in fourteenth-century Damascus, Ibn al-Shatir linked his studies in theoretical astronomy to those of earlier mathematicians, four of whom had worked in thirteenthcentury Maragha, one in eleventh-century Egypt, two in twelfth-century Spain, and two who originated in thirteenth-century Syria and North Africa. All had written in Arabic, the language in which Ibn al-Shatir also wrote. The example is representative of situations that existed before and after Ibn al-Shatir, though there were cases in which Persian and Turkish were the languages of composition, especially in later times. But once we direct our attention to situations, as distinguished from tradition, our picture and our problematic will change with every case, as we turn from one set of circumstances to another in which individual choices are made with reference to specific problems proposed by specific contexts. Not, of course, that tradition and individual response are separable: on the contrary, the former provides an inseparable part of the intellectual context in which the other must take place. When I started to write this talk I hoped to be able to illustrate and perhaps also to characterize in some general terms the interplay of tradition and individual response with reference to one or two episodes of Arabic science. In the end I am forced to leave that subject for another time and place.
